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UNCONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT SPEECH
In Wooley v. Maynard, the United States Supreme Court
held that the state of New Hampshire could not impose crimi-
nal sanctions on a citizen who covered the motto "Live Free
of Die," which appeared on his motor vehicle license plate.
This Comment analyzes the Wooley decision and discusses
the fundamental first amendment doctrines at issue, includ-
ing compelled speech, symbolic speech, and governmental
speech. The author concludes that this case marks the devel-
opment of a constitutional restriction on government's par-
ticipation in the system of political expression.
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
part, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . ."' Strictly construed, this language prohibits legisla-
tively' imposed restraints on the exercise of free speech by individu-
als. This prohibition does not expressly restrict speech by the govern-
ment itself. However, the United States Supreme Court was recently
confronted with a direct challenge to the constitutionality of govern-
ment speech. In Wooley v. Maynard,3 the Supreme Court exhibited
an increased willingness to decide the controversy surrounding gov-
ernmental speech against the government and its agencies. This deci-
sion marks the evolution of a new judicial attitude toward protec-
tions guaranteed by the first amendment.
The Supreme Court held in Wooley that the state of New Hamp-
shire could not constitutionally enforce criminal sanctions against
residents who cover from view the motto "Live Free or Die," which
appears on state issued passenger vehicle license plates. In a 7-2
decision, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, stated that
forcing "an individual . . . to be an instrument for fostering public
adherence to an ideological point of view. . . 'invades the sphere of
1. The first amendment states "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
2. The freedom of speech secured by the first amendment against abridg-
ment by the United States Congress is applied to the states through the four-
teenth amendment. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
3. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to
our Constitution to reserve from all official control.' "", This ruling,
which focuses on the purpose of the first amendment, reflects an
expansive reading of first amendment principles and has significant
implications for future interpretations of the first amendment's rela-
tionship with governmental activities.
In Wooley, appellee George Maynard had been convicted for
knowingly obscuring the slogan on his motor vehicle license plate.
5
Mr. Maynard had covered the motto with tape because it was repug-
nant to his political beliefs.6 After his state conviction was entered,7
Maynard brought a civil action seeking declaratory and injuctive
relief in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983.0
The district court held in favor of Maynard and ordered a permanent
injunction against all further arrests for covering the motto.' Re-
spondent Neal Wooley, Chief of Police of Lebanon, New Hampshire,
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which heard the case
on November 29, 1976.10
Historic difficulties with first amendment principles surfaced as
the Court attempted to resolve the major constitutional issues re-
garding the legal consequences of expression and dissent.1 ' The
4. Id. at 715 (quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943)).
5. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 262:27-c (Supp. 1973). The term letters in the
statute has been interpreted to include the motto which appears on the license
plate. State v. Hoskin, 112 N.H. 332, 295 A.2d 454 (1972). Initially, the appellee,
George Maynard, merely placed tape over the motto. However, because neigh-
borhood children kept removing the tape, Mr. Maynard snipped the words "or
Die" off the license plate and covered the resulting hole, as well as the words
"Live Free," with tape.
6. In an affidavit Mr. Maynard stated that he believed life was more precious
than freedom. He also asserted religious objections to the motto. Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 n.2. (1977). However, the religious objections are
beyond the scope of this discussion.
7. Actually, Maynard was convicted on three separate occasions. He refused
to pay the fines imposed as sentences for the violations and was incarcerated for
a period of 15 days.
8. Section 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within thejurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-
ing for redress.
9. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.H. 1976).
10. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in Wooley v. Maynard,
426 U.S. 946 (1976).
11. Although the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech was added
to the Constitution in 1791, it was not until 1919, in Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919), that the Supreme Court began to address systematically the
question of the scope of free-speech principles. As to historical difficulties in
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Court in Wooley was confronted with three fundamental con-
stitutional doctrines. First, Maynard challenged his conviction on
the ground that New Hampshire had unlawfully compelled him to
perform acts reasonably likened to speech, thereby violating the
compelled speech doctrine. Second, Maynard contended that his
conviction infringed on his right to expression through protected
symbolic speech. Finally, and most significantly, he challenged the
constitutionality of New Hampshire's participation in activity
amounting to political expression. The Supreme Court's treatment of
these fundamental first amendment doctrines make Wooley one df
the most important free speech cases heard by the Burger Court.
COMPELLED SPEECH
One of Maynard's principal constitutional defenses to his convic-
tion was that the state of New Hampshire, by requiring him to
display the motto on his license plate, compelled him to engage in
speech, thereby violating his first amendment rights. The Supreme
Court agreed, stating:
We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought
protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both
the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at
all .... A system which secures the right to proselytize religious,
political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant
right to decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak and the
right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the
broader concept of "individual freedom of mind. ' 12
The main support for the Court's holding was West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette.3 In this case the Court held uncon-
delineating first amendment protections, see H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL
FAITH (1968); R. CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES POLICY
(1975); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970). Professor
Emerson states:
The outstanding fact about the first amendment today is that the Su-
preme Court has never developed any comprehensive theory of what
that constitutional guarantee means and how it should be applied in
concrete cases .... [I]t has done little to deal with some of the newer
problems, where the issue is not pure restraint on governmental inter-
ference, but rather the use of government power to encourage freedom
of expression or the actual participation by government itself in the
system of expression.
Id. at 15-16.
12. 430 U.S. at 714 (quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 637 (1943)).
13. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Barnette overruled a long line of precedent, most
notably Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), which had upheld
the legitimacy of the required flag salute and pledge of allegiance.
stitutional a state statute requiring public school children to recite
the pledge of allegiance while simultaneously saluting the flag. Jus-
tice Jackson, writing the majority opinion, stated: "If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.' 1 4 Compelling children to
affirm a belief by speech and gesture was deemed by the Court to be
an unconstitutional infringement upon first amendment rights.
In comparing Wooley to Barnette, the Court contrasted the forced
salute of the flag and recitation of the pledge of allegiance with the
required display of a political motto. The Court decided that the
difference was "essentially one of degree,' 5 with both situations
comprising unconstitutional attempts by states to compel speech on
behalf of their residents.
The dissent in Wooley, written by Justice Rehnquist,16 also relied
on the holding in Barnette but disagreed with its application to
Wooley. The dissent stated that the difference between the two cases
was not merely one of degree but one of kind. This difference in kind
was based on the nature of the acts performed. In Barnette, the
school children were required actively to speak words and to stand with
arms extended in a saluting gesture. In Wooley, the compelled act
was the display of a motto which appeared'on a license plate. Thus,
Barnette involved active conduct whereas Wooley involved only pas-
sive conduct because Maynard would be required to display a license
plate regardless of the appearance of a motto thereon.1 7 Justice Rehn-
quist concluded: "The State has not forced appellees to 'say' any-
thing; and it has not forced them to communicate ideas with nonver-
bal actions reasonably likened to 'speech,' such as wearing a lapel
button promoting a political candidate or waving a flag as a symbolic
gesture."' 8
14. 319 U.S. at 642.
15. The Court stated: "Compelling the affirmative act of a flag salute in-
volved a more serious infringement upon personal liberties than the passive act
of carrying the state motto on a license plate, but the difference is essentially one
of degree." 430 U.S. at 715.
16. Justice Blackmun joined in the dissent. Id. at 719 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting).
17. The states' power to license automobiles has been upheld in a number of
cases. E.g., Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932); Carley & Hamilton, Inc. v.
Snook, 281 U.S. 66 (1930).
18. 430 U.S. at 720 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent continued:
The Court recognizes, as it must, that this case substantially differs
from Barnette, in which school children were forced to recite the pledge
of allegiance while giving the flag salute .... However, the Court states
"the difference is essentially one of degree." But having recognized the
rather obvious differences between these two cases, the Court does not
explain why the same result should obtain.
Id. at 721.
818
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Recognition of this distinction between the two cases does not end
the inquiry. The passive-active differentiation exists, but is it a satis-
factory basis for deciding the constitutional issue involved? The dis-
sent in Wooley argued that compelling passive acts is not unconstitu-
tional because the passive act carries no affirmation of belief. The
dissent reasoned that first amendment principles are only implicated
when the state places the citizen in the position of either appearing to
assert or actually asserting the truth of the message. Because the
state of New Hampshire had not placed Maynard in a position of
appearing to assert the truth of "Live Free or Die," no compelled
speech existed.19 The majority disagreed, stating that compelling pas-
sive acts also results in identification between the actor and the
message conveyed, thus falling within the ambit of Barnette and
constituting compelled speech.
The little constitutional precedent on point supports the dissent. In
Engel v. Vitale,20 the Court struck. down a state statute requiring
public school children to recite a prayer in class. 21 In Torcaso v.
Watkins,22 a unanimous Court held that a newly appointed notary
public could not be denied his commission because he refused to take
an oath, required by the Maryland Constitution, declaring his belief
in the truth of a religious tenet.23 In Baggett v. Bullitt, 24 the Court
invalidated a requirement that teachers take an oath swearing to
promote respect, by precept and example, for the flag and the institu-
tions of the United States and the state of Washington. 25 In each of
19. Id.
20. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
21. In Shelton v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963), the district court
invalidated a requirement that school children sing the National Anthem in
class, stating that "government authority may not directly coerce the unwilling
expression of any belief, even in the name of 'national unity."' Id. at 775.
22. 367 U.S. 488 (1961)
23. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, stated: "We repeat and again
reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally
force a person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion."' Id. at 495.
24. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
25. In Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972), the Court articulated the gener-
al proposition that:
[N]either federal nor state government may condition employment on
taking oaths that impinge on rights guaranteed by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments respectively, as for example those relating to polit-
ical beliefs .... Nor may employment be conditioned on an oath that
one has not engaged, or will not engage, in protected speech activities
such as the following: criticizing institutions of governffent; discussing
political doctrine that approves the overthrow of certain forms of gov-
ernment; and supporting candidates for political office.
Id. at 680.
these cases the government compelled active conduct which resulted
in an unconstitutional restriction of first amendment rights.26
Although prior to Wooley the Court had not confronted the prob-
lem of compelled passive activity, the decisions rendered in the com-
pelled speech cases emphasized the connection between active
conduct and the appearance of, or actual endorsement of, the truth of
the message conveyed. Even in Barnette, on which the majority in
Wooley relied, the Court stated: "It is also to be noted that the
compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief
and an attitude of mind.
'27
The compelled speech doctrine prohibits forced activity which
places the actor in a position of affirmatively asserting, or appearing
to assert, the truth of a political or philosophical message. In each
case, the determination of whether compelled speech exists invari-
ably depends upon whether a viewer would reasonably conclude that
However, oaths requiring a person to swear to uphold the Constitution have
been affirmed on the ground that the Constitution itself authorizes such oaths.
Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; id. art. VI, cl. 3.
The Supreme Court has invalidated a number of loyalty oaths under void-for-
vagueness principles. In Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), Justice White
stated:
The uncertain meanings of the oaths require the oath-taker ... to "steer
far wider of the unlawful zone". . . than if the boundaries of the forbid-
den areas were clearly marked. Those with a conscientious regard for
what they solemnly swear or affirm, sensitive to the perils posed by the
oath's indefinite language, avoid the risk of loss of employment, and
perhaps profession, only by restricting their conduct to that which is
unquestionably safe. Free speech may not be so inhibited.
Id. at 372. See, e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Cramp v. Board of
Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
For extensive discussions of loyalty oaths, see R. BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECU-
RITY (1958); H. HYMAN, To TRY MEN'S SouLs: LOYALTY OATHS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY (1959); Asken, Loyalty Oaths in Retrospect: Freedom and Reality,
1968 Wis. L. REV. 498.
26. For cases considering the related question of governmental subsidy of
political speech by affiliated organizations such as labor unions and bar associa-
tions, see note 75 and accompanying text infra.
27. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,633 (1943). The Court
further emphasized the active nature of the compelled conduct:
To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that a Bill
of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, left
it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his
mind.
Whether the First Amendment to the Constitution will permit officials
to order observance of ritual of this nature does not depend upon
whether as a voluntary exercise we would think it to be good, bad or
merely innocuous .... Hence the validity of the asserted power to force
an American citizen publicly to profess any statement of belief or to
engage in any ceremony of assent to one, presents questions of power
that must be considered independently of any idea we may have as to
the utility of the ceremony in question.
Id. at 634.
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the actor was affirming the truth of the message. 8 Many factors must
be considered in ascertaining whether conduct is sufficiently as-
sociated with the actor to convey the reasonable impression that the
actor is asserting the truth of the message. These factors include
whether the actor is compelled to perform active or passive
conduct;29 whether observers are aware, or by observation become
aware, that the actor is engaging in activity similarly required of all
persons situated in the actor's class or category; 30 what the physical
proximity is between the required activity and the actor himself;3 '
and how visible and conspicuous the activity or motto is. 32 This list is
not exhaustive because the determination is basically one of fact and
a variety of circumstances is possible.
Of primary importance is the recognition that compelled speech
principles only apply when there is a sufficient relationship between
the actor and the activity to convey a reasonable impression that the
actor is asserting the truth of the message carried by the activity.33
28. For example, if a viewer observed the children involved in Barnette, the
reasonable conclusion drawn would be that the children believed in the patriotic
message conveyed by saluting the flag and reciting the pledge of allegiance.
29. The active-passive distinction is especially relevant because of its relation
to the purpose underlying the compelled speech doctrine. The Court in Bar-
nette, where the compelled speech doctrine originated, was concerned with the
dangers inherent in a ceremonial setting where groups of people appear,
through required activity, to affirm the truth of a political tenet or precept. See
note 76 infra. Surely, the oath cases demonstrate that a ceremonial setting is not
essential to a finding of compelled speech, but the emphasis put upon the
ceremonial aspect in the majority of cases indicates the Court's willingness to
invalidate state statutes which compel active conduct.
30. In State v. Hoskin, 112 N.H. 332,295 A.2d 454 (1972), on which the dissent in
Wooley relied, the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated its opposition to the
claim of compelled speech:
Similarly, we think that viewers do not regard the uniform words or
devices upon registration plates as the craftsmanship of the registrants.
They are known to be officially designed and required by the State of
origin. The hard fact that a registrant must display the plates which the
State furnished to him if he would operate his vehicle is common knowl-
edge.
Id. at 336-37, 295 A.2d at 457.
31. In general, display of a motto on a lapel button carries a greater degree of
appearance of affirmation of belief than display of a motto on a license plate.
See text accompanying note 18 supra.
32. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
33. Id. at 721 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In fifth amendment self-incrimina-
tion cases, the Court makes a similar distinction between compelled conduct
which is communicative or testimonial and compelled conduct which is not
communicative and therefore not violative of the right against self-incrimina-
tion. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice exemplars); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplars); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967) (utilization of articles of clothing); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966) (submission to blood test).
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Because the first amendment grants protection to communications, 34
compelled conduct which does not involve communication by the
actor is beyond the scope of the compelled speech doctrine.35
The dissent in Wooley correctly dismissed the compelled speech
challenge to Maynard's conviction because Maynard was not forcibly
placed in a position of appearing to assert the truth of the motto. A
reasonable observer would not conclude that Maynard believed in
the truth of "Live Free or Die" simply because his required license
plate displayed the motto. A reasonable observer would conclude
that the government which instituted the motto believed in its truth
and was communicating this belief to the public through the required
motto.36 Therefore, no compelled speech existed in Wooley, and pro-
per disposition of the case depends on more applicable first amend-
ment principles.
SYMBOLIC SPEECH
The federal district court that heard Wooley ruled that Maynard's
conviction was unconstitutional because he was engaged in protect-
ed, symbolic speech. 37 The court reasoned that the act of covering the
motto was intended to call attention to the motto's effacement and
thereby communicate Maynard's disagreement with its contents.
New Hampshire citizens were aware that the motto appeared on the
license plates of passenger vehicles. The likelihood therefore was
great that they would interpret Maynard's conduct as an expression
34. See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
(1970).
35. The Court stated, in footnote 15 of its opinion, that a minimum degree of
identifiability between the actor and the message conveyed is required to invoke
compelled speech principles:
It has been suggested that today's holding will be read as sanctioning the
obliteration of the national motto, "In God We Trust" from United
States coins and currency. That question is not before us today but we
note that currency, which is passed from hand to hand, differs in signifi-
cant respects from an automobile, which is readily associated with its
operator.
430 U.S. at 717 n.15.
Although this statement correctly expounds the method of disposition of
compelled speech cases, it is hardly consistent with the reasoning used in the
text of the majority opinion. The difference between the compelled acts in
Barnette and the compelled display of the motto upon United States currency
whenever tender of that currency is made is also one of degree, yet the Court
differentiates between display of the motto in Wooley and display of the motto
on the dollar bill. This inconsistency is difficult to explain and evidences the
Court's problems in deciding Wooley on compelled speech principles.
36. For discussion of unconstitutionality of government speech, see notes 61-
103 and accompanying text infra.
37. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381 (DN.H. 1976).
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of conscientious objection to the motto. Having concluded that May-
nard's act of obscuring the motto was intended to be expression, and
was readily perceived as such, the district court enjoined further
prosecution for this expression of an idea through conduct.38
However, the Supreme Court, including the majority and the dis-
senting justices,39 dismissed the symbolic speech defense on the
ground that Maynard's intent in placing tape over the motto was not
to communicate affirmative opposition to the motto. The Court's
reasoning was based upon Maynard's request to the trial court that
he be issued license plates on which no motto appeared. Because of
this request for expurgated plates, the Court determined that May-
nard's overriding concern was to free himself from the class of per-
sons required to display the motto.4" Communicating affirmative
opposition to the motto was not the purpose of covering the motto;
therefore, no symbolic speech existed.
In formulating this approach to the issue of symbolic speech, the
Court relied substantially on Spence v. Washington.41 In this case, a
college student had hung an upside-down American flag with a peace
symbol attached to it outside his apartment window. He was convict-
ed under Washington's "improper use" statute forbidding the exhibi-
tion of a United States flag to which figures, symbols, or other
extraneous material are attached or superimposed. 42 The student
testified without contradiction at trial that he displayed his flag in
such a manner to protest against then-recent United States actions in
Cambodia and fatal events at Kent State University.43 His express
purpose was to associate the American flag with peace instead of
with war. The Supreme Court overturned his conviction on the
38. Id. at 1387.
39. Justice Brennan was the only member of the Court who appeared to
support the symbolic speech claim. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 n.10
(1977).
40. The majority stated in footnote 10:
We note that appellees' claim of symbolic expression is substantially
undermined by their prayer in the District Court for issuance of special
license plates not bearing the state motto .... This is hardly consistent
with the stated intent to communicate affirmative opposition to the
motto. Whether or not we view appellees' present practice of covering
the motto with tape as sufficiently communicative to sustain a claim of
symbolic expression, display of the "expurgated" plates ... would sure-
ly not satisfy that standard.
Id. at 713 n.10. See also State v. Hoskin, 112 N.H. 332, 295 A.2d 454 (1972).
41. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.86.020 (1974).
43. 418 U.S. at 408.
ground that the appellant was engaged in protected, symbolic
speech. The Court emphasized that the symbolic speech doctrine
applies only when the surrounding circumstances indicate purpose-
ful activity designed to convey a point of view which would be
understood by those viewing the activity.
44
As the Supreme Court in Wooley reasoned, the crux of the symbol-
.c speech issue was the intent of Maynard at the time he covered the
mntto. The district court found that an intent to communicate exist-
ed; the Supreme Court found that one did not.
The basic question was one of fact, and primary reliance in an-
swering this question should have been placed upon Maynard's state-
ment of his purpose in covering the motto. Maynard stated that his
chief concern in obscuring the motto was his refusal to be coerced by
the state to advertise a slogan which he found politically abhorrent.45
Maynard did not expressly request that the state of New Hampshire
remove the motto from all passenger vehicle license plates. He never
objected to the motto as applied to all automobile owners within the
state. Thus, Maynard was not objecting to the state's policy of requir-
ing the motto in general; he was only objecting because he was
required to display the motto. This distinction is crucial to the Su-
preme Court's disposition of the symbolic speech issue. The Court
ruled that because Maynard was not purposely conveying a message
in opposition to the motto, no symbolic speech had occurred.46 There
44. The Court in Spence stated:
The context in which a symbol is used for purposes of expression is
important, for the context may give meaning to the symbol .... A flag
bearing a peace symbol and displayed upside down by a student today
might be interpreted as nothing more than bizarre behavior, but it
would have been difficult for the great majority of citizens to miss the
drift of appellant's point at the time that he made it .... An intent to
convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it.
Id. at 410-11. For additional cases dealing with the foundations of symbolic
speech, see Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing black
armbands in opposition to the Vietnamese War); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968) (burning draft card in protest to the Selective Service System).
See also Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amend-
ment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 29 (1973); Note, Symbolic Speech, 43 FORDHAM L. REV.
590 (1975).
45. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1384 n.3 (D.N.H. 1976).
46. If a person destroys United States Selective Service records to protest
against the Vietnamese War, he is engaged in symbolic speech. However, ac-
cording to the Court in Wooley, if he burns his selective service records solely to
protest against the possibility that he may be drafted into participation in the
war, no symbolic speech would exist. The person would merely be attempting to
free himself from that class of individuals required to fight in the war. In the
absence of any statement against the war in general, the Court would dismiss a
symbolic speech challenge to a conviction for burning the records because there
was no purposeful activity designed to convey a particularized message. For
criticism of the Court's reasoning, see text accompanying notes 47-55 infra.
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was no purposeful expression of a viewpoint through activity.
This construction of the symbolic speech issue demonstrates the
Court's willingness to grant less protection to communication by
conduct than to communication by pure speech.4 7 If Maynard had
driven'his automobile while simultaneously speaking over a loud-
speaker, "I object to the requirement that I display the motto 'Live
Free or Die,' the Court would have determined at the outset that
Maynard was engaged in speech. Justification for arrest and punish-
ment for such speech would depend on the existence of any legiti-
mate state interests warranting a restriction upon the exercise of
pure speech.48 Paradoxically, obscuring the motto, which essentially
communicates to others Maynard's same objection to display of the
motto, does not even meet the definitional test of symbolic speech. To
support a finding of symbolic speech, the Court requires conduct
primarily intended to convey a particularized message which would
be understood by those viewing the conduct. This strict requirement
does not exist in pure speech cases where the mere act of speaking
automatically triggers first amendment principles regardless of
whether a particularized message is intended.
The distinction between pure speech and symbolic speech is a
result of the difficulties involved in finding the communicative as-
pect in a wide variety of conduct. To some extent, all conduct is
communicative, because the observer of the conduct can make cer-
tain conclusions about the actor's reasons and justifications for his
behavior.49 Often the actor's behavior can be interpreted in differing
47. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,555 (1965), Justice Goldberg stated: "We
emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communi-
cate ideas by conduct... as these amendments afford to those who communi-
cate ideas by pure speech." Accord, Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394
U.S. 147 (1969); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
48. Justice Holmes stated in Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206
(1919): "[T]he First Amendment while prohibiting legislation against free speech
as such cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for
every possible use of language." In Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919),
the Court similarly stated that spoken words, which are within the freedom of
speech protected by the first amendment, may be subject to restrictions if they
create a clear and present danger. See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
49. Professor Emerson states:
To some extent expression and action are always mingled; most conduct
involves elements of both .... The guiding principle must be to deter-
mine which element is predominant in the conduct under consideration.
Is expression the major element and the action only secondary? Or is
the action the essence and the expression incidental?
ways and given different meanings. It becomes very difficult to as-
certain accurately whether a person, by his conduct, is intending to
communicate.5 0 Conduct which is non-communicative is not pro-
tected by the first amendment because it does not aid in the exchange
of ideas. 51
The Supreme Court focused upon Maynard's request for expur-
gated plates in holding that he did not intend to engage in
communicative conduct. The district court relied on the fact that
Maynard must have intended to communicate because everyone
viewing the taped-over motto would understand Maynard's objec-
tion to its contents. 52
Behavior is often motivated by more than one purpose. In Wooley,
it is clear that Maynard objected to the motto. By obscuring the
motto, Maynard expressed his opposition to self-display of the motto
and communicated this opposition to others. Regardless of which
purpose was paramount, it is clear that Maynard had some intention
to communicate to others his objection to the content of the motto 3
Recent commentators have suggested that courts employ a "sub-
stantially" or "primarily communicative" intention test to support a
finding of symbolic speech in difficult cases.54 The decision in
Wooley supports this assessment. Despite the fact that Maynard had
more than one purpose in covering the motto, the Court found that
the communicative intent was not primary and therefore dismissed
Maynard's symbolic speech claim.
The sole justification for such a strict test lies in the problem of
proving communicative intent. Because proving intent is so difficult,
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 80 (1970). See also Nimmer,
The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 29 (1973); Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1091 (1968).
50. For difficulties in proving intent, see C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THELAW OF EVIDENCE § 295 (2d ed. 1972) ("State of mind is a matter inherently
difficult of proof."); J. WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF § 116 (1931)(proof of intent is based on inferences).
51. See Wright v. Bailey, 381 F. Supp. 924 (D. Va. 1974) (jerking arm free of
policeman's grasp does not constitute symbolic speech); Davis v. Firment, 269 F.Supp. 524 (D. La. 1967) (wearing long hair is not symbolic speech (the Court also
dismissed the right to privacy issue)).52. The district court relied on factual determinations initially stated in the
earlier New Hampshire Supreme Court case of Hoskin v. State, 112 N.H. 332,295
A.2d 454 (1972).
53. Communicating to others his opposition to self-display of the motto
strongly implies opposition to the contents of the motto. Maynard v. Wooley, 406
F. Supp. 1381, 1387 (D.N.H. 1976).
54. "[Aln intent to communicate is not alone sufficient to make conduct
equivalent to pure speech. Further, there must be no other intent other than one
to communicate." Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1091, 1103 (1968).See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 80 (1970).
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the Court requires an extra burden of proof to be met by individuals
who assert that their conduct is symbolic speech.
Such a justification is not persuasive in view of the fundamental
quality of first amendment protections.55 The Court's requirement
that conduct be primarily communicative places an undue restriction
upon the right of expression through conduct. Instead, symbolic
speech determinations should focus on whether reasonable evidence
exists to conclude that any communicative intent existed at the time
the activity in question was performed. This method of construing
symbolic speech issues preserves a necessary burden of proof and
simultaneously gives maximum protection to fundamental first
amendment rights.
Application of this test to the facts in Wooley would lead to the
conclusion that Maynard was engaged in symbolic speech. Rea-
sonable evidence did exist which indicated that Maynard possessed
some communicative intent when he covered the motto.
However, a finding that Maynard's conduct satisfies the defini-
tional test of symbolic speech does not provide the final answer to the
case. Symbolic speech, as opposed to pure speech, takes place
through a non-verbal medium. When the medium serves sufficiently
important state interets, destruction of the medium is unlawful re-
gardless of any intention to communicate by such destruction. Illus-
trative is United States v. O'Brien,56 in which respondent O'Brien
was convicted of burning his draft card in violation of federal law.
O'Brien had burnt his draft card to communicate his opposition to
the Vietnamese War and therefore challenged his conviction on the
ground that he was engaged in protected, symbolic speech. The Court
recognized the communicative nature of his conduct but upheld his
conviction, reasoning that the medium of his communication, the
draft card, served sufficiently important federal interests to justify
criminal conviction for its destruction.57
55. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S.
1, 4 (1949); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946); Lovell v. Green, 303 U.S.
404, 405 (1938).
56. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
57. "[Elven on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in
O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does
not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is
constitutionally protected activity." Id. at 376.
A finding of symbolic speech merely triggers examination of the constitution-
ality of prohibiting destruction of the medium-whether it is a draft card or a
motto appearing on a license plate. In Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969), a
Similarly, in Wooley, the medium of communication was the
license plate, or more precisely, that part of the license plate where
the motto appeared. New Hampshire required the motto as part of its
licensing scheme. When, as in Wooley, the state requires the medium
of communication as a means to promote an asserted governmental
interest, then destruction of the medium is unlawful regardless of
any intent to communicate by its destruction. 8 Maynard's oblitera-
tion of the motto was therefore unlawful unless he could demon-
strate59 either the unconstitutionality of the required display of the
motto or the unconstitutionality of the motto itself.6° The finding of
symbolic speech merely initiates an examination of the constitution-
ality of New Hampshire's requirement that passenger vehicle license
plates display the motto "Live Free or Die."
In the preceding discussion of compelled speech, it is shown that
the requirement that Maynard display the motto was not unconstitu-
tional because his display of the motto did not convey a reasonable
impression that he was affirming the truth of the motto. Therefore,
to challenge successfully his conviction, Maynard must have demon-
strated that the motto itself is unconstitutional. A finding of symbol-
ic speech is parasitic on the ultimate and decisive issue in Wooley,
which involved the constitutionality of New Hampshire's participa-
tion in political and ideological speech.
criminal conviction for burning the flag was overturned on symbolic speech
grounds because the state could advance no interest sufficiently important to
prevent destruction of the flag. The crux of the issue lies not in a finding of
symbolic speech but in a finding that the state cannot prohibit destruction of the
medium of the symbolic speech. If a state can constitutionally restrain destruc-
tion of the medium, then the fact that the destruction of the medium qualifies as
symbolic speech is irrelevant. See also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405
(1974). In Wooley, the district court recognized the parasitic nature of the sym-
bolic speech issue but unsatisfactorily dismissed it by assuming, without discus-
sion, that the motto was constitutionally objectionable. 406 F. Supp. at 1387.
58. For example, if the medium of Maynard's symbolic expression were a
license plate upon which appeared the motto "New Hampshire is Nice," destruc-
tion of the medium by covering it with tape would be unlawful, even though
Maynard would be engaging in symbolic speech by communicating his opposi-
tion to the contents of the motto. If the motto is permissible, then obliteration of
it is punishable.
59. The burden of proof was on Maynard. Legislative enactments are pre-
sumed valid, and the burden is on the party attacking the statute to prove its
unconstitutionality. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Bar-
rett v. Shapiro, 410 U.S. 356 (1973); Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144
(1944); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212 (1827).
60. The distinction between the requirement of the motto and the motto itself
is exemplified by Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), and
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). In Engel, the Court struck down the require-
ment that school children participate in religious prayer but allowed willing
school children to continue praying in class. In Abington, the Court struck
down prayer recitation in public schools altogether, despite the fact that unwil-
ling school children did not have to participate in the prayer ceremony.
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UNCONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT SPEECH
To reverse his conviction, Maynard had to argue that his conduct,
amounting to symbolic speech, was protected because the motto
itself was unconstitutional political expression by New Hampshire.
However, prior to Wooley, the Supreme Court had never proscribed
government activity which amounted to political speech. In fact, the
Court had not faced a case challenging such political speech. In
Wooley, the Court confronted the motto "Live Free or Die," which
clearly conveyed a political message.6 1 By initiating and compelling
placement of the motto upon passenger vehicle license plates, New
Hampshire participated in conduct substantially identical to
speech.6
2
A few constitutional cases have discussed incidentally the issue of
governmental promulgation of ideological views. In Public Utilities
Commission v. Pollack,63 passengers on municipal streetcars and
buses brought an action against the transit commission challenging
the constitutionality of broadcasting radio programs through loud-
speakers on the streetcars and buses. The Court upheld the legality of
the radio programs on the grounds that such programs did not inter-
fere with the passenger's conversation and, more significantly, that
there was no showing that the radio broadcasts contained any polit-
ical or philosophical content. 64 The majority did suggest that any use
of the radio programs to broadcast political messages would be ob-
jectionable.6 5 In dissent, Justice Douglas stated:
When we force people to listen to another's ideas, we give the prop-
agandist a powerful weapon. Today it is a business enterprise work-
ing out a radio program under the auspices of government. Tomorrow
it may be a dominant political or religious group. Today the purpose is
benign; there is no invidious cast to the programs. But the vice is
inherent in the system .... It may be but a short step from a cultural
program to a political program.
66
61. The... motto, which is reminiscent of the words of Patrick Henry-
"[B]ut as for me, give me liberty or give me death."-derives from the
words of Major General John Stark, reputed to have been written in
1809 as part of a toast in a letter to former comrades-at-arms: "Live free
or die; death is not the worst of evils."
Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1383 n.1 (D.N.H. 1976).
62. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), where the Court held that
written words displayed to others constituted speech.
63. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
64. Id. at 463.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 469 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
In Abington School District v. Schempp,67 the Court struck down
the recitation of official prayers in public schools. Justice Clark,
writing the majority opinion, contended that the religious exercises
violated the first amendment command that the government main-
tain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion. 68 In the
earlier case of Engel v. Vitale,69 in which the Court invalidated the
required narration of prayer in public schools, 70 Justice Black stated:
"It is neither sacrelgious nor antireligious to say that each separate
government in this country should stay out of the business of writing
or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious func-
tion to the people themselves .... ,,71 Justice Douglas, in his concur-
ring opinion, stated that the first amendment dictates that the gov-
ernment have no interest in theology or religion.72
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights ,73 the Court upheld the right
of a city transit system to prohibit the display of political campaign
advertisements on municipal buses. Asserted justifications for the
decision were that users of the buses would be subjected to a blare of
propaganda and that problems would arise with the distribution of
limited space to a large number of campaigning politicians. v4 The
mention of the possibility of harmful official interference with the
political process indicates a distrust of political speech by govern-
ment agencies.7 5 This attitude toward government participation in
67. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
68. Id. at 225.
69. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
70. For distinction between the requirement of prayer and the prayer itself,
see note 60 supra.
71. 370 U.S. at 435.
72. Id. at 443 (Douglas, J., concurring). See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 563-64 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Justice Douglas dissented from
the majority's holding that the state of Maryland could constitutionally restrict
the operation of a wide variety of business on Sundays).
73. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
74. Id. at 304.
75. In a related area, the Court ruled that a labor union, created pursuant to
federal law, had no authority to make political expenditures with required dues
payments over the employee's objection. International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). In Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), the Court,
in a plurality opinion, upheld the right of a state bar association to expend
required dues payments for political purposes. The Court in Lathrop did not
reach the first amendment question, stating that the petitioner had not suffi-
ciently alleged the particular political expenditures to which he objected. How-
ever, both Justices Douglas and Black argued in dissent that the first amend-
ment issue was properly before the Court. They contended that political expen-
ditures of required dues money was an unconstitutional infringement upon free
speech. Justice Douglas stated: "[T]he First Amendment applies strictures de-
signed to keep our society from becoming moulded into patterns of conformity
which satisfy the majority." Id. at 885 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The dissenting opinions in Lathrop have been affirmatively cited in Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), for the proposition that the government may not
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the system of political expression is especially manifest in Barnette,
where the Court focused on the constitutional and political problems
which inevitably arise whenever official support and approval is
marshalled behind a particular message or belief.7 6
finance the dissemination of ideas to which dues-payers disagree when the
financial backing of the dissemination comes from required dues payments.
In addition, many lower courts have confronted the constitutionality of state-
university newspapers which make political endorsements. Such endorsements
have been upheld because the state has a legitimate interest in providing stu-
dents a forum of expression and, of greater consequence, because there has
never been any showing that official state control has been exerted over the
editorial content of the paper. In Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149,152 (D.
Neb. 1973), the district court stated that any such official state control "would
raise grave constitutional questions." See, e.g., Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456
(4th Cir. 1973); Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp. 1348 (D.N.C. 1974).
These cases were concerned with government authorization of organizations
which make political endorsements. They did not involve speech by government
entities; rather, they dealt with speech by organizations associated with govern-
ment entities. However, these decisions do indicate the courts' negative attitude
toward political speech by organizations affiliated with government.
76. In Barnette, the majority overruled the holding and rationale of Miners-
ville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), where Justice Frankfurter
stated, in favor of the required flag salute and recitation of the of pledge
allegiance:
We are dealing with an interest inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal
values. National unity is the basis of national security....
The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive
sentiment. Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind
and spirit which may serve to gather up the traditions of a people,
transmit them from generation to generation, and thereby create that
continuity of a treasured common life which constitutes a civiliza-
tion ....
Id. at 595-96.
Justice Jackson, writing the majority in Barnette, answered the Gobitis deci-
sion, stating:
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many
good as well as by evil men .... As first and moderate methods to attain
unity have failed, those bent on its accomplishment must resort to an
ever-increasing severity. As governmental pressure toward unity be-
comes greater, so strife becomes more bitter as to those whose unity it
shall be .... Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is
the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out
Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means
to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian
unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies.
Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves
exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves
only the unanimity of the graveyard.
It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment to our
Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these begin-
nings. There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or of
the nature or origin of its authority. We set up government by consent of
the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal
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However, no court has explicitly ruled on the constitutionality of
government speech. Even in Wooley the Court ostensibly evaded the
issue while unsatisfactorily attempting to decide the case on com-
pelled speech grounds. Nevertheless, an implied recognition of New
Hampshire's unconstitutional participation in political speech is evi-
dent in the Court's statement that "a state measure which forces an
individual. . . to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to
an ideological point of view. . . 'invades the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
Constitution to reserve from all official control.' "7 Reluctance to
announce expressly the unconstitutionality of governmental speech
is the result of the recognition that the first amendment does not, by
its terms, prohibit governmental political expression. However, a
broad interpretation of the first amendment to encompass a prohibi-
tion against governmental speech corresponds to the purpose and
intent of the Framers in enacting the first amendment.
The drafters of the first amendment intended its guarantees to be
read in a broad and liberal sense.7 8 Professor Emerson, a leading
authority on first amendment principles, states that the precise
meaning of the first amendment at the time of its adoption is a matter
of dispute.79 However, he reasons that the provision was intended to
assure the new nation the basic elements of a system of free expres-
sion as then conceived. As constitutional law has developed, the first
amendment has come to have the same broad significance for our
present, more complex society. The fundamental purpose of the first
amendment is to guarantee an effective system of expression suitable
for the present time. 0 A broad interpretation of the first amendment
is essential to the perpetuation of free government by free men.
81
opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by
public opinion, not public opinion by authority.
319 U.S. at 640-41.
77. 430 U.S. at 715 (quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943)).
78. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816), Justice
Story stated:
The Constitution unavoidably deals in general language. It did not suit
the purposes of the people, in framing this great charter of our liberties,
to provide for minute specifications of its powers .... The instrument
was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but
was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events of which were
locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Providence.
In Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914), Justice Holmes stated:
"[T]he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having
their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted
from English soil." Similarly, in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419
(1827), Justice Marshall confirmed the necessity of a broad and liberal reading
of constitutional provisions. See also Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
79. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 15 (1970).
80. Id.
81. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946); Martin v. City of Struthers,
[VOL. 15: 815, 1978] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
The Framers of the Constitution were concerned with restrictions
placed upon basic individual rights by dominating governments.
82
The drafters' purpose was to preserve and maintain a political ma-
chinery which would protect the people's right and ability
83 to gov-
ern themselves.84
Governmental intrusion into the system of political expression
impinges upon first amendment purposes and principles in two re-
spects. First, speech by the government inhibits the process of the
political mechanism itself. Freedom of expression is a method of
achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable political envi-
ronment by maintaining the balance between healthy disagreement
and necessary consensus.8" Governmental speech distorts this system
by its coercive effect upon the otherwise free exercise of choice by the
citizenry. As Justice Jackson stated in Barnette: "We set up govern-
ment by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those
in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent."86
Freedom to choose and to decide among competing directions and
319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 594 (1942); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1940).
82. In his first inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson stated: "Let us restore to
social intercourse that harmony and affection without which liberty and even
life itself are but dreary things .... [We have gained little if we countenance a
political intolerance as despotic, as wicked and capable of ... bitter and bloodly
persecutions." THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 384-85 (S. Padover ed. 1943).
83. The principle that man possesses the ability to govern himself is the result
of the recognition of man's essential capacity to reason. John Locke stated:
The Freedom then of Man and Liberty of acting according to his own
will, is grounded on his having Reason, which is able to instruct him in
that Law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is
left to the freedom of his own will.
J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 63 (1690) (emphasis original).
84. Justice Brandeis stated in a concurring opinion in Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927):
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the
State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means .... They believed
that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth ....
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969), the Court
stated: "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail." See also T. EMER-
SON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-9 (1970); note 76 supra.
85. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970).
86. 319 U.S. at 641. See also A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 15-16 (1948). Professor Meiklejohn similarly states that the
exercise of political choice by the electorate must be made without coercion
from the state.
policies which the government should adopt would have little practi-
cal significance if those in power were allowed to influence and to
coerce the will of the citizens. The potential for abuse is clear if the
government could place its power and prestige in a position of sup-
porting particular political ends. Justice Black, in En gel v. Vitale,87
objected to required prayer in public schools, stating: "When the
power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind
a particularized religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon
religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved
religion is plain. ''88
These apprehensions are as aptly applied to government participa-
tion in political speech. Governmental speech will necessarily tend to
distort the political mechanism by consolidating public opinion and
coercing minority support to the detriment of government's ability to
adapt to change and ultimately to exist in a stable and democratic
state.89 These are precisely the political dangers which the Framers
sought to prevent by adoption of the first amendment.
A- second difficulty arising from governmental speech is that it
elevates the position and the prestige of government to a potentially
dangerous level. Such speech by government will not only establish
certain political and ideological propositions as true but will also
establish an appearance of government infallibility. As government
consolidates more support and agreement behind its positions and
policies, its appearance of credibility strengthens. Minority views
become less forceful as government increases its image and prestige.
The effect will not only inhibit the democratic process but will also
encroach upon social progress as government becomes an over-
whelmingly powerful institution in society. Government's power to
promulgate beliefs will increase as government's position in society
rises to that of the ideological spokesman for an ever-growing major-
ity. The inevitability of abuse is clear. Governmental participation in
speech will lead to a loss of individual freedom as the prestige of
government increases and predominates in significance over the in-
dividual and alternative social institutions. Governmental political
speech necessarily tends to inhibit intellectual diversity and social
progress.90
87. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
88. Id. at 431.
89. This course of argument may lead to the conclusion that governmental
political speech is prohibited by the express language of the first amendment
because governmental speech indirectly abridges the individual's right to free
speech. However, the indirectness of the abridgment places governmental polit-
ical speech beyond the express language of the first amendment.
90. Alexis de Tocqueville, in his famous work, Democracy in America, point-
ed out the harmful effect that "majority tyranny" can have on the vitality of a
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The purpose of the first amendment is to protect citizens from the
very dangers that governmental speech will necessarily cause. Its
basic unconstitutionality is clear. However, the prohibition against
governmental speech should not be absolute. To interpret and apply
this first amendment principle to actual disputes, it is necessary to
define the exact nature and extent of this prohibition against govern-
ment's participation in political and in ideological speech.
To qualify as governmental speech, the message asserted must be
identifiable with the government as a whole. Clearly, the President,
as the executive, may engage in political speech, as may congressmen
or the Congress as a whole, and the Supreme Court justices, or the
Supreme Court as a whole.9 The dangers inherent in governmental
political expression arise because the government can use its power
and prestige to influence political and social direction; therefore,
such speech is only prohibited when exercised by, or apparently
exercised by, the government as a whole.9 2 In addition, the speech, or
activity likened to speech, must embody a political or philosophical
message.93 Mere speech without objectionable content is permissible.
democratic state. A. DE TOCQuEViLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1832). In Z.
CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (1947), Professor Chafee re-
cognized the disproportionate amount of power government can obtain when it
affirmatively attempts to influence and to direct social and political policy. This
observation is especially true in view of the power of mass media and the limited
number and variety of entities having access to the avenues of mass media. See
generally Finman & Macaulay, Freedom to Dissent: The Vietnam Protests and
the Words of Public Officials, 1966 WIs. L. REV. 632.
91. In Methodist Fed'n for Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C.
1956), a religious social organization brought suit against members of the Senate
Internal Security Subcommittee, alleging that the subcommittee had falsely
published a defamatory pamphlet which declared plaintiff to be a Communist
front. In dismissing the complaint the Court stated:
Nothing in the Constitution authorizes anyone to prevent the President
of the United States from publishing any statement. This is equally true
whether the statement is correct or not, whether it is defamatory or not,
and whether it is or is not made after a fair hearing. Similarly, nothing in
the Constitution authorizes anyone to prevent the Supreme Court from
publishing any statement. We think it equally clear that nothing au-
thorizes anyone to prevent Congress from publishing any statement.
Id. at 731. For sovereign immunity aspects of high-level government officials'
liability, see Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
92. Although the motto "Live Free or Die" was instituted by the legislature, it
is identifiable with the state of New Hampshire as a whole.
93. In Protestants & Other Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v.
O'Brien, 272 F. Supp. 712 (D.D.C. 1967), plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Postmas-
ter General of the United States from issuing a postage stamp bearing the
picture of the Madonna. The Court rejected the first amendment challenge,
Governmental speech violates the first amendment rights of each
resident within the jurisdiction of the government body which en-
gages in political speech. Therefore, any individual within that juris-
diction would have standing to challenge the legitimacy of such
speech. The infringement upon first amendment rights satisfies the
"trifling interest" test, thereby conferring standing on all residents.
94
Thus, in Wooley, the fact that an automobile owner brought the
action is immaterial to the final disposition of the case. Any New
Hampshire resident has standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the motto because each resident's first amendment rights have been
violated.
Similarly, the fact that the state required people to display the
motto is immaterial. The motto itself is unconstitutional, not the
required display of the motto. 95 Even if New Hampshire placed the
motto "Live Free or Die" on billboards overlooking the state's high-
ways,96 it would be unconstitutional.9 7
No first amendment guarantee is absolute.98 The prohibition
against governmental speech would similarly be subject to possible
legitimate state interests which justify restrictions upon first
amendment rights. In Wooley, New Hampshire unsuccessfully at-
tempted to justify the motto on two grounds. First, the State
contended that because registration of passenger automobiles was
legitimate, the motto, as part of that registration scheme, was per-
reasoning that the picture of the Madonna was ceremonial and not associated
with a religious tenet. See Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
In Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970), petitioner brought suit
against the United States, attacking the constitutionality of the phrase "In God
We Trust," which appears on United States currency. The Court held that such a
phrase was excluded from first amendment significance because the motto had
no theological or ritualistic impact. The reasoning in Aronow is difficult to
accept in view of the legislative history of 31 U.S.C. § 324a (1970), which au-
thorizes the appearance of the motto on United States currency. The history
shows that the motto was adopted to reflect the "spiritual basis of our way of
life." For an alternative ground to uphold the motto "In God We Trust," see text
accompanying note 103 infra, discussing the "de minimis" rationale.
94. In United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973), the Court stated:
"The basic idea that comes out in numerous cases is that an identifiable trifle is
enough for standing ...... In Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278
(1961), the Court held that a person who cannot take a loyalty oath without
committing perjury has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the oath.
See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
95. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
96. See Wooleyv. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 721 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
97. This point illustrates the irrelevancy of the symbolic speech issue. Al-
though the facts in Wooley involve defacement of a license plate, Maynard
would have a valid constitutional challenge to the motto whether he had ob-
scured it or not. See notes 57-60 and accompanying text supra.
98. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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missible.9 9 The Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating:
"Even were we to credit the State's reasons and 'even though the
government purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental person-
al liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.' "100
Second, New Hampshire maintained that the motto was permissi-
ble because it promoted patriotism and state pride. The Court agreed
that promotion of patriotism is a legitimate state interest,10 1 but
stated that such an interest cannot outweigh the first amendment
rights at stake.1
2
However, it is possible that situations could arise whereby govern-
mental speech may be allowed. Such speech, designed to arouse
patriotism during a time of war, may be justified, depending upon
the content of the message conveyed. Another plausible state justifi-
cation for governmental political expression may arise when the
administrative inconvenience in halting the speech outweighs the
"de minimis" effect of the governmental speech.10 3
CONCLUSION
The first amendment embodies principles which preserve individu-
al civil liberties. When these civil liberties are threatened, the first
amendment must expand to provide the necessary protections. The
growth of government coupled with the development of mass media
presents new questions concerning freedom of expression and of
communication. 0 4 As the number and the variety of entities having
99. The motto was placed only on passenger vehicle license plates, not on
commercial vehicle license plates. The state argued that this differentiation
fulfilled an integral function of the registration and licensing process.
100. 430 U.S. at 716 (1977) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960)).
101. Id. at 716. In Barnette, the Court stated: "'[T]he. state may require
teaching by instruction and study of all in our history and in the structure and
organization of our government, including the guaranties of civil liberty, which
tend to inspire patriotism and love of country."' West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943) (quoting Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310
U.S. 586, 604 (1940)).
102. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
103. This justification applies where the United States has already issued
currency bearing the motto "In God We Trust." The near impossibility of recal-
ling all currency and issuing new expurgated currency outweighs the minimal
effect of the motto. However, this justification would not prevent the issuance of
new currency without the philosophical motto appearing on it. See Aronow v.
United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970); note 93 and accompanying text supra.
104. See Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (1947); Shipley,
Some Constitutional Aspects of Transit Radio, 11 F.C. BAR. Ass. J. 150 (1950).
access to the avenues of mass media decrease, the power and the
prestige of these entities increase. The potential for abuse threatens
first amendment freedoms.
The Supreme Court in Wooley v. Maynard made significant state-
ments concerning the compelled speech and symbolic speech aspects
of the first amendment. More importantly, the Court's implied recog-
nition of the unconstitutionality of government speech has major
implications for the future of the system of political expression. The
emphasis on the purpose of the first amendment demonstrates the
Court's favorable disposition to grant full constitutional protection
to freedom of speech. Now is the time for the judiciary to define
expressly the limits of governmental activities in the political ma-
chinery. The decision in Wooley indicates the Court's willingness to
set these boundaries.
JAY S. BLOOM
Constitutional commentators have also been considering the status of govern-
mental speech as it affects public school book selections and curriculae. See,
e.g., Goldstein, Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to
Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. Ruv. 1293 (1976); Schauer, School
Book, Lesson Plans, and the Constitution, 78 W. VA. L. REV. 287 (1976).
